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PROTECTING THE TAX-EXEMPT STATUS OF HOUSING
DEVELOPERS PARTICIPATING IN LOW-INCOME
HOUSING TAX CREDIT PARTNERSHIPS
Marni Hussong
Abstract:The Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) is an important source of federal
funding for developers of affordable housing for low-income persons. Although for-profit and
nonprofit developers compete for credits, the federal government reserves ten percent of the
credits for nonprofit, tax-exempt developers. Exempt developers often sell the credits to forprofit investors, forming a partnership through which the exempt organization develops the
housing and the investors receive tax benefits in exchange for capital contributions. The
partnership formation, however, may jeopardize the tax-exempt status of the nonprofit
organizations and result in the partnership losing the LIHTC. To maintain exempt status, the
Internal Revenue Code requires that organizations be organized and operated to promote a
charitable purpose and that no net earnings inure to private individuals. A combination of
binding and non-binding authority provides confusing guidelines for exempt organizations
seeking to protect their exempt status. This Comment examines the federal requirements for
the award of LIHTC and traces the development and application of a two-prong test used by
the Internal Revenue Service to determine whether partnership structures jeopardize exempt
status. This Comment argues that exempt developers in LIHTC partnerships need binding
authority that details the level of control of partnership activities the exempt organization
must retain, provides an exception for certain partnership guarantees by exempt organizations
that are standard within the development industry, and allows investors to receive private
benefits to a greater degree without jeopardizing the organization's exempt status.

The Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC)' provides federal tax
incentives to encourage private investors to contribute funding for
developing housing for low-income households.2 Since its inception in
1986, the successful program has become the primary source of funding
for low-income housing development.3 Nearly $300 million in credits4
are available annually for both for-profit and tax-exempt developers of
housing for tenants with below average incomes.5 Although both for1. 26 U.S.C. § 42 (1994).
2. Jonathan Klein & Roberta Rubin, Nonprofit Guaranties in Tax Credit Transactions, 9:1 J.
AFFORDABLE HOUSING 92,94 (1999).
3. See The Enterprise Foundation, Low-Income Housing Tax Credit-OurView, at http://www.
enterprisefoundation.orgpolicy/lihtcourview.asp (last visited Jan. 29, 2001).
4. Lynn Kawecki & Marvin Friedlander, Recent Developments in Housing Regarding
QualificationStandardsand PartnershipIssues, in IRS EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS CPE TECHNICAL
INSTRUCION PROGRAMTEXMOOK Part Il(2)(B) (1995).
5. Funding provides nearly 70,000 housing units. Michael Novogradac, Low-Income HousingTax
Credit:Proposalsfor the Next Century, 9:1 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING 104, 108 (1999).
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profit and exempt developers compete for credits, the program maintains
a preference for exempt developers by reserving ten percent of the total
credits for tax-exempt organizations.'
Tax-exempt, low-income housing developers generally do not owe
taxes and cannot directly use credits.7 Exempt developers, therefore, sell
the credits to for-profit investors who use the credits to reduce their tax
liabilities.! In addition to the credits, the for-profit investors gain an
ownership interest in the project.9 In general, the project is structured as a
limited partnership in which the exempt organization serves as the
general partner'0 and retains a one percent interest, while the investors
serve as limited partners," obtaining a ninety-nine percent interest in the
partnership profits, losses, deductions, and credits.' 2 As general partner,
the exempt organization assumes the partnership liabilities. To qualify
for exempt status, the exempt organization must maintain control of the
day-to-day activities of the partnership to demonstrate that it is furthering
its exempt purpose. 3
The resulting partnership may jeopardize the tax-exempt status of the
nonprofit developer, which in turn will make the partnership ineligible to
use the LIHTC reserved for exempt organizations. The Internal Revenue
Code (Code) and corresponding Treasury regulations detail the
requirements for federal tax exemption. 4 An organization may receive
and retain exempt status upon a showing that a charitable purpose was
the primary motivation for forming the organization and that such
purpose is furthered by the daily operations of the organization.' 5 To
6. See 26 U.S.C. § 42(h)(5)(A) (1994).
7. MICHAEL I. SANDERS, JOINT VENTURES INVOLVING TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS § 12.2(c),

at 417 (2d ed. 2000).
8. Id. The credits attract investors who purchase them for a reduced price. For example, in 1995,
credits sold for forty to sixty cents on the dollar. Kawecki & Friedlander, supra note 4, at Part
II(2)(B).
9. SANDERS, supranote 7, § 1.5, at 7.
10. A general partner in a limited partnership has the liabilities of a partner in a partnership.
Uniform Limited Partnership Act § 403, 6A U.L.A. 177 (1995). A partner is "liable jointly and
severally for all obligations of the partnership unless otherwise agreed .... " Uniform Partnership
Act § 306, 6 U.L.A. 45 (1995).
11. A limited partner is "not liable for the obligations of a limited partnership unless ... he
participates in the control of the business." Uniform Limited Partnership Act § 303, 6A U.L.A. 144
(1995).
12 SANDERS, supranote 7, § 12.2(c), at 418.
13. Id. § l.', at 10.
14. 26 U.S.C. § 501(a)-(c)(3) (1994); 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3) (2000).
15. 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(b)-(c).

Tax Credit Partnerships

determine whether the partnership between the for-profit investors and
exempt developer violates the requirements of the Code for retaining
exempt status, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) developed a twopronged "strict scrutiny" test.'6 The test focuses on the organization's

charitable purpose and control of the venture, as well as any resulting
private benefits. 7

An examination of federal requirements for exempt status, General20

9
8
Counsel Memorandums, Private Letter Rulings, Revenue Rulings,

and limited case law suggests that many LIHTC partnership agreements
actually place the exempt status of organizations at risk. In 1995 the
Ninth Circuit, in Housing Pioneers,Inc. v. Commissioner,2' revoked the
tax-exempt status of an organization engaged in an LIITC partnership

based on the exempt organization's lack of control over partnership
activities.' In the following two years, the IRS issued three non-binding
Private Letter Rulings stating that guarantees committing an exempt
organization's assets to protect the assets of the for-profit investor would
produce an impermissible private benefit resulting in a loss of exempt
status.2 3
Currently, many uncertainties exist about the degree of control the
exempt developer must retain over the partnership, the types of guarantees24 the exempt developer can provide to the partnership, and the

types of benefits that can be gained by for-profit investors without
16. Gen. Courns. Mem. 39,005 (June 28, 1983).
17. Id.
18. A General Counsel Memorandum (GCM) provides advice on a specific substantive or
procedural tax issue. Internal Revenue Manual (37) 121 § l(b) (1983). GCMs are for research
purposes for the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and are not statements of the IRS's position on
issues. Id. § (1)(c).
19. A Private Letter Ruling (PLR) is a written statement to a taxpayer interpreting and applying
tax law to a set of facts. Rev. Proc. 2000-1, 2000-1 I.R.B. 11. Taxpayers may rely on PLRs
responding to their specific inquiries, but may not rely on another taxpayer's PLR. Id.
20. A Revenue Ruling is the IRS's conclusion on how a law is applied to specific facts. Id.at 11.
Revenue Rulings are not binding precedent on the Tax Court but may acquire the force of law if the
ruling details accepted administrative practices. Am. Campaign Acad. v. Comm'r, 92 T.C. 1053,
1070 (1989). Taxpayers may rely on Revenue Rulings when the facts of the taxpayer's situation are
similar. Id.
21. 58 F.3d401 (9th Cir. 1995).

22 Id. at 404.
23. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-36-039 (June 9, 1997); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-31-038 (May 7, 1997); Priv.
Ltr. Rul. 96-16-005 (Dec. 19, 1995).
24. Due to the lack of assets of exempt organizations, investors often seek indemnities and
guarantees obligating the exempt organization to use available assets to make additional capital
contributions or cover unforeseen costs. Klein & Rubin, supra note 2, at 92.
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sacrificing the developer's exempt status. The confusion for
organizations in LIHTC partnerships seeking to protect their exempt
status is due to a combination of binding and non-binding authority, each
applying one or more of several tests to a variety of types of partnerships.
The IRS must give clear guidance to exempt organizations in LIHTC
partnerships. Those partnerships that received credits shortly after the
program was established in 198625 will realize the end of the minimum
fifteen-year compliance period 26 in 2001. If the IRS determines that the
exempt organizations have jeopardized their status, the partnerships will
be ineligible for the LIHTC and ultimately the development of housing
for low-income persons will decline.
Part I of this Comment examines the federal requirements both for the
award of LIHTC for financing housing for low-income persons and for
exempt status under § 501(c)(3) of the Code based on the creation and
commitment to a charitable purpose. Part II details the development of
the two-part "strict scrutiny" test for determining whether the exempt
status of an organization in a partnership is at risk. Part Ill explains that
the current law surrounding exempt-status determinations of organizations in partnerships does not offer clear guidance to nonprofit
developers in LIHTC partnerships. Part IV argues that the IRS should
issue a Revenue Procedure27 as binding authority providing guidance to
exempt developers using the LIHTC. In particular, the IRS should
address control over daily management activities and ultimate voting
control, guarantees by the developer that are standard in the industry but
may place charitable assets at risk, and the degree to which private
benefit may inure without adversely affecting the organization's exempt
status.
I.

TO QUALIFY FOR THE LIHTC EXEMPT DEVELOPERS
MUST SATISFY ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA AND EXEMPTSTATUS REQUIREMENTS

To qualify for the ten percent LIHTC set-aside, exempt developers
must comply with the Internal Revenue Code requirements governing
25. See SANDERS, supra note 7, § 12.2(a), at 416.
26. Recipients of the LIHTC must maintain reduced rents for fifteen years. 26 U.S.C. § 42(i)(1)
(1994).
27. A Revenue Procedure outlines the internal practices and procedures of the IRS in
administering tax laws. WILLIAM RAABE ET AL., WEST'S FEDERAL TAX RESEARCH 96 (4th ed.
1997).

Tax Credit Partnerships
eligibility for receipt of the LIHTC and exemption from federal income
tax. Exempt developers of housing for low-income persons are eligible
for the LIHTC if they commit to serving low-income households28 for a
minimum of fifteen years,29 retain an ownership interest in the
partnership, and actively participate in the management and operation of
the project.3 ° An organization developing housing for low-income
persons is eligible for exemption from federal income taxation upon
proof that the organization was created to and continues to further a
charitable purpose without providing a private benefit to any individual
or entity."
A.

QualificationRequirementsfor Exempt OrganizationsApplyingfor
LIHTC

The federal government allocates the LIHTC to designated state
agencies to award credits to developers of housing for low-income
families.32 Because they generally owe no taxes and cannot directly use
the tax credits, 33 tax-exempt recipients may sell the credits to private
investors who reduce their tax liabilities over a ten-year period.3 4 This
transaction generally results in the formation of a partnership between
the exempt "developer" and the for-profit "investor."3' To be awarded
and maintain the credits, a recipient must comply with various Code
requirements. First, the Code requires that projects receiving credits
restrict unit rental to households with below-average incomes and limit
rental prices to less than thirty percent of the household's monthly
income.36 Second, developers must maintain these rent restrictions for a
minimum compliance period of fifteen years.37 The recipient must also

28. 26 U.S.C. § 42(g).
29. Id. §42(i)(1).

30. IL §42(h)(5)(B).
§ 501(a)-(c)(3).
31. See kat
32. See SANDERS, supranote 7, § 12.2(d), at 423.

33. Id.§ 12.2(c), at 417.
34. See 26 U.S.C. § 42(t)(I).
35. See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text. This Comment refers to anonprofit partner as a
"developer" and a for-profit partner as an "investor."
36. 26 U.S.C. § 42(g). For income limits in each metropolitan area see generally U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, FY 2000 HUD INCOME LiMaS: BRIEFING

MATERAL (2000). HUD defines "low-income" as below eighty percent of the area's median
income. Id. at 1.
37. 26 U.S.C. § 42(i)(1).
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agree to an extended low-income commitment3 8 providing further
protections to low-income residents including an additional fifteen-year
obligation to maintain the restricted rents39 and a prohibition on the
refusal to rent to tenants receiving federally subsidized housing
assistance.40 Finally, the nonprofit organization must "materially
participate in the development and operation of the project throughout
the compliance period."' An exempt organization will generally satisfy
the "material participation" requirement if it serves as the general partner
of the partnership owning the project."
Although the LIHTC qualification criteria are the same for both forprofit and nonprofit developers, the Code states a preference for
allocating credits to exempt organizations.43 In particular, the Code
requires that states award at least ten percent of the total credits to
projects sponsored by "qualified nonprofit organizations." The Code
provides a three-part definition for "qualified nonprofit organizations."
First, the organization must have § 501(c)(3) status.4 Second, the
organization may not be "affiliated with" or "controlled by" a for-profit
organization.' Finally, one of the exempt purposes of the organization
must be "fostering" low-income housing.4 7
B.

Exempt Developers Awarded the LIHTC Must Demonstratethat
They Were Createdfor and Continue To FurtherCharitable
Purposes

Organizations meeting the requirements of the Code and the
corresponding Treasury Department Regulations (Regulations) may
apply for exemption from federal income tax. Section 501 of the Code
provides for exemption of certain organizations that were created to and
continue to further charitable purposes.4 8 The regulations provide a
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. § 42(h)(6)(A).
See id. § 42(h)(6)(B)(i).
Id. § 42(h)(6)(B)(iv).
Id. § 42(h)(5)(B).

42 SANDERS, supranote 7, § 12.2(d), at 424.

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

See 26 U.S.C. § 42(h)(5)(A).
Id. § 42(h)(5)(C).
Id. § 42(h)(5)(C)(i); see also infra Part I.B.
26 U.S.C. § 420i)(5)(C)(i).
Id. § 42(h)(5)(C)(iii).
Id. § 501(a)-(c)(3).
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definition for "charitable" purposes and detail methods for determining
whether an organization is organized and operated for such purposes.49
1.

The Code Establishesthe EligibilityRequirementsfor Exempt
Status

Organizations receive exemption from federal income taxation under
50
§ 501(a) of the Code if they meet the requirements detailed in § 501(C).
Developers of housing for low-income persons apply for exemption as
charitable organizations under § 501(c)(3)." To qualify, a developer
must be "organized and operated exclusively for... charitable...
purposes... [and] no part of the net earnings of [the developer may
inure] to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual."5 2 If the
organization profits from activities not related to its charitable purpose, it
will be taxed on that portion of its income53 and may lose its exempt
status.54
2.

TreasuryRegulationsDefine Key Terms Relating to Tax-Exempt
Status Determinations

The Regulations provide binding authority for interpreting the
requirements of § 501 of the Code. First, the Regulations exempt
developers of housing for low-income persons if they have a "charitable"
purpose under the Code.55 For example, relief of the "poor and distressed
or of the underprivileged" is a charitable purpose.5 6 Another charitable
purpose is the promotion of social welfare by organizations designed to
"i) lessen neighborhood tensions; ii) to eliminate prejudice and
discrimination; ... [and] iv) to combat community deterioration ....

49. 26 C.F.RL § 1.501(c)(3) (2000).
50. 26 U.S.C. § 501(a).
51. Itr § 501(c)(3).
52. Id.
53. Id. § 501(b).
54. Tax-exempt organizations will lose exempt status if more than an insubstantial part of their
activities are not charitable. See generally 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3).
55. See 14L§ 1.501(c)(3)-l(d)(1)(b).
56. Id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2).
57. Id.
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In addition to having a charitable purpose, a developer seeking exempt
status must satisfy the organizational test detailed in the Regulations."
Under this test, an organization's articles of organization 9 must establish
a charitable purpose,60 obligate the organization to further an exempt
purpose as its primary activity, and dedicate the assets to a charitable
purpose upon dissolution of the entity.6 1 In particular, the articles must
limit the purposes of the organization to one or more exempt purposes
and prohibit the organization from engaging in activities that do not
further an exempt purpose unless such activities are insubstantial.6 2 Even
if the members orally commit or the actual activities of the organization
operate to further one or more exempt purpose, a developer will fail the
organizational test if the articles do not obligate the organization to
further its exempt purpose.63
Finally, an organization seeking exempt status must also operate
exclusively for one or more exempt purposes.' The organization will not
meet this test if more than an insubstantial part of its activities does not
further an exempt purpose.65 If an organization operates to further an
exempt purpose but substantially engages in another activity with a nonexempt purpose, it will fail the operational test and be ineligible for
exempt status. Another factor used in determining if the operational test
is met is whether an organization's "net earnings inure in whole or in
part to the benefit of private shareholders or individuals." 6 Private
shareholders or individuals have a "personal and private interest in the
activities of the organization. 6 7
Nonprofit organizations seeking to use the LIHTC to develop housing
for low-income households must comply with federal requirements for
58. Id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(a).
59. The term "articles
of organization" refers
to any instrument written to create the organization.
Id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(2).
60. Id. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(b)(l)(i)(a).
61. Id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b). In addition, tax-exempt organizations may not be organized to
influence legislation
or participate inpolitical
campaigns.Id. § 1.501(c)(3)-I(b)(3).
62. Id. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(b)(1)(a) to (b). "Neither the Internal Revenue Code, the regulations, nor
the case law provide ageneral definition of'insubstantial' for purposes of section 501 (c)(3)." Living
Faith, Inc. v. Comm'r, 950 F.2d 365, 371 (7th Cir. 1991).
63. 26 C.F.R. § 1.50 1(c)(3)-l(b)(1)(b)(iv).
64. Id. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(a)(1).
65. Id. § 1.501 (c)(3)- (c)(1);
see also Better Bus. Bureau of Wash. D.C., Inc. v.United States,
326 U.S. 279,283 (1945) ("The presence of asingle [non-exempt] purpose, if substantial in nature,
will destroy the exemption regardless of the number or importance of truly [exempt] purposes.").
66. 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(c)(2).
67. Id. § 1.501(a)-l(c).
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the award of LIHTC and for exempt status under the Code. To receive
the credits, an organization must commit to restricting rents for thirty
years" and to participating in the operation of the project.69 The
organization must also maintain its § 501(c)(3) status.7 ° The Code
requires that the organization have a charitable purpose and that it be
organized and operated further that purpose.7'
II.

IRS AND JUDICIAL DETERMINATIONS OF EXEMPT
STATUS OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS IN

PARTNERSHIPS
Historically, the ability of an organization to receive and maintain
exempt status hinged on whether the organization was organized and
operated to further an exempt purpose under § 501(c)(3) of the Code. Of
particular importance to housing developers is that § 501(c)(3) of the
Code permits developing affordable housing to be a charitable purpose.
As partnerships between exempt organizations and for-profit partners
became more common, a series of IRS rulings and court decisions
formed a two-part test to determine whether partnerships jeopardize an
organization's exempt status. The IRS's application of this two-part test
to various exempt organizations created an assortment of binding and
non-binding authority for developers in LIHTC partnerships seeking to
protect their exempt status. In addition, the courts have developed a
separate "commerciality doctrine" that prohibits exempt organizations
from competing with for-profit entities. Developers must satisfy both the
two-part test and the commerciality doctrine to maintain exempt status.
A.

The IRS InitiallyEstablishedthat the Development ofHousingfor
Low-Income Persons Can Be a CharitablePurpose

Prior to 1968, the IRS provided little guidance as to whether housing
developers were eligible for exempt status. During the late 1960s and
1970s two Revenue Rulings and a U.S. Tax Court decision offered
guidance to determine whether providing housing to low-income persons

68. See 26 U.S.C. § 42(h) (6) (1994).
69. Id. § 42(h)(5)(B).
70. Id. § 42(h)(5XC)(i).
71. 26 C.F.R. §1.501(c)(3)-(a)(1).
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qualifies as a charitable purpose under the Code.7' When providing
examples of charitable purposes, the non-binding Revenue Rulings relied
on the definition of "charitable" within the Regulations. The Tax Court
also required organizations to satisfy the organizational and operational
tests from the Regulations.73
In 1968, the IRS issued Revenue Ruling 68-17 and declared that
housing developers for low-income persons may qualify as § 501(c)(3)
organizations.74 The IRS considered the exempt status of a nonprofit
organization that instituted a housing program for low-income persons
and provided information about the program to other organizations.75 The
organization acquired, rehabilitated, and sold or leased deteriorating
residential buildings in distressed neighborhoods.76 The Ruling indicated
that the purpose and activities of the organization are charitable to the
extent community deterioration is reduced by providing housing to lowincome persons.77
Two years later, the IRS released Revenue Ruling 70-585,78 providing
more specific analysis of types of housing organizations qualifying for
exempt status. Similar to Revenue Ruling 68-17, this Ruling relied on the
definition of "charitable" in the Regulations. In particular, the IRS found
numerous purposes exempt under § 50 1(c)(3) including (1) relieving the
poor by providing housing to those who could otherwise not afford it,
(2) eliminating prejudice and discrimination by developing mixedincome buildings, and (3) combating community deterioration by
rehabilitating residential buildings.79
Several years later the Tax Court further clarified the activities related
to housing development that are considered charitable under the Code. In
B.S. W. Group, Inc. v. Commissioner,0 the court applied the organizational8 ' and operational 82 tests of the Regulations to revoke the tax72. B.S.W. Group, Inc. v. Comm'r, 70 T.C. 352 (1978); Rev. Rul. 70-585, 1970-2 C.B. 115; Rev.
Rul. 68-17, 1968-1 C.B. 247.
73. B.S. W. Group, 70 T.C. at 356.
74. Rev. Rul. 68-17, 1968-1 C.B. 247.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Rev. Rul. 70-585, 1970-2 C.B. 115.
79. Id.
80. 70 T.C. 352 (1978).
81. See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
82. See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
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exempt status of an organization providing consulting services for a fee
to nonprofit organizations engaged in rural development. 3 Although
B.S.W. Group met the organizational requirements of the Code, the Tax
Court held that the organization failed the operational test by not
operating exclusively for charitable purposes under § 501(c)(3) because
84
its primary purpose was operating a commercial for-profit business.
Thus, to qualify as an exempt organization under § 501(c)(3), a lowincome housing developer must satisfy the charitable-purpose
requirement, the organizational test, and the operational test.
B.

Development ofa Two-Prong Test To Determine Whether
OrganizationsPartneringwith For-ProfitInvestors Qualify'for
Exempt Status

Even if an organization qualifies as an exempt § 501(c)(3)
organization under the above tests, the organization might lose its
exempt status if it partners with for-profit investors. The IRS initially
took a firm position that partnerships between for-profit and nonprofit
entities would result in the loss of tax-exempt status." The Ninth Circuit
rejected this position in Plumstead Theatre Society, Inc. v.
Commissioner.6 The IRS then released a memorandum containing a
two-prong test to determine whether or not a charitable purpose is
fostered by the partnership."
In 1975, the IRS established a per se rule against joint ventures
between for-profit investors and nonprofit organizations in General
Counsel Memorandum 36,293.88 This Memorandum addressed a
partnership formed to provide housing to low- and middle-income
households. 89 The IRS stated that a limited partnership with an exempt
organization as general partner was "legally incompatible with operating
exclusively" for a charitable purpose." The IRS based this decision on
three factors. First, the partnership allowed sharing of profits between

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

B.S.W. Group, 70 T.C. at 352.
Id at 360.
Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,293 (May 30, 1975).
675 F.2d 244 (9th Cir. 1982), af'g 74 T.C. 1324 (1980).
Gen. Couns. Mem 39,005 (June 28, 1983).
Gen. Couns. Mere. 36,293 (May 30, 1975).
Id.

90. Id.
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private investors and charitable organizations. 9' Second, the nonprofit
entity serving as general partner promoted the financial interests of the
for-profit partners. 92 Finally, the equity of the private investors was
protected while the charitable assets of the general partner were at risk.93
In 1982, the Ninth Circuit in Plumstead Theatre Society, Inc. v.
Commissioner94 affirmed the Tax Court's decision to reject the per se
rule that exempt organizations lose their § 501(c)(3) status when they
partner with for-profit investors. Plumstead Theatre, a § 501(c)(3)
organization that promoted the performing arts, 96 formed a limited
partnership with several investors and took on the role of the general
partner to produce a single play.97 The limited partners provided the
necessary capital in exchange for a 63.5% share in the profits from the
production.98 The Ninth Circuit upheld the Tax Court's decision that the
exempt status of the theatre was not jeopardized by the partnership. 9 The
Tax Court's decision was based on four factors. First, the transaction was
at arm's length and for a reasonable price."° Second, the organization
was not obligated to return the limited partner's capital.'' Third, the
partnership had no interest in any other plays,0 2 eliminating the
possibility of a profit motive. 10 3 Finally, the limited partners had no
control over the operation or management of the partnership."°
The following year, the IRS released General Counsel Memorandum
39,005, which articulated a two-part test for determining whether the
formation of a partnership between for-profit investors and an exempt
organization requires revoking an organization's tax-exempt status. 0 5
91. Id.

92 Id.
93. Id.
94. 675 F.2d 244, 245 (9th Cir. 1982), af/'g 74 T.C. 1324 (1980).
95. Id.; see also Rochelle Korman & Dahlia Balsam, Joint Ventures with For-Profits After
Revenue Ruling 98-15, 27 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REv. 441,442 (2000); Michael Sanders & Susan A.
Cobb, Recent IRS Rulings Provide New Standards for Joint Ventures Involving Charities, 18
EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 213 (1997).
96. Plumstead,675 F.2d at 244.
97. Id. at 245.
98. Plumstead,74 T.C. at 1328.
99. Plumstead,675 F.2d at 245.
100. Plumstead,74 T.C. at 1333.
101. Id. at 1333-34.
102. Id.at 1334.
103. Korman & Balsam, supranote 95, at 442; Sanders & Cobb, supra note 95, at 214.
104. Plumstead,74 T.C. at 1334.
105. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,005 (June 28, 1983).
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Memorandum 39,005 responded to a request for a ruling on the
§ 501(c)(3) status of a nonprofit general partner in a limited partnership
formed to construct and to operate housing for the elderly and
handicapped.'" The IRS determined that the organization's exempt
status was not jeopardized because under the partnership agreement the
organization acted exclusively to further its exempt purpose.'0 7 The IRS
set out a two-pronged "strict scrutiny" test."°8 Under this test, a partnership must (1) further a tax-exempt purpose and (2) be structured to
ensure that the exempt organization will act exclusively to further
exempt purposes without benefiting the nonexempt partners.' °9
C.

Recent Application and Refinement of the Two-Prong Test

Although not always referring to the two-prong test, the IRS has
continued to refine the several factors within the test to determine
whether an organization will lose its exempt status by participating in an
LIHTC partnership. The first prong, testing whether the partnership
furthers an exempt purpose (the charitable-purpose prong), was clarified
by a 1996 Revenue Procedure with guidelines for developers seeking
exempt status for developing housing." 0 The second prong, (the privatebenefit prong) requires that (1) the nonprofit entity control the
partnership to enable it to further its charitable purpose, (2) the
partnership does not obligate the nonprofit to place its charitable assets at
risk, and (3) the partnership does not create a private benefit for the forprofit investors."' The private-benefit prong is generally the crucial part
2 General Counsel
of the test and has been applied in several cases,"
4
Rulings."
Letter
Memorandums,"' and Private

106.
107.
108.
109.

Id.
IX.
Id.
Id.

110. Rev. Proc. 96-32, 1996-1 C.B. 717.

111. Id.
112. See, e.g., Hous. Pioneers, Inc. v. Comm'r, 58 F.3d 401 (9th Cir. 1995), aff'g T.C. Memo
1993-120 (1993); Am. Campaign Acad. v. Comm'r, 92 T.C. 1053 (1989).
113. E.g., Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,444 (July 18,1985).
114. See Priv. Litr. Rul. 97-36-039 (June 9, 1997); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-31-038 (May 7, 1997); Priv.
Ltr. Rul. 96-16-005 (Dec. 19, 1995).

Washington Law Review
1.

Vol. 76:243,2001

HousingDevelopers Can Satisfy the Charitable-PurposeProngin
Two Ways

Revenue Procedure 96-32 defines a safe harbor for organizations to
satisfy the charitable-purpose prong by providing relief to the poor
through developing housing for low-income persons.'15 The Procedure
also describes the conditions necessary for an organization not falling
within the safe harbor to secure exempt status under the Code." 6 Both
situations in the Procedure focus on whether the housing development
qualifies as charitable by providing relief to the poor and distressed." 7
To fall within the safe harbor, the organization must reserve at least
seventy-five percent of the apartments in each project for low-income
tenants."' In addition, low-income persons must actually occupy the
units." 9 The organization may rent the remaining units to families that do
not qualify as low-income. 20 The IRS determined that this mix of
income levels "assist[s] in the social and economic integration"
necessary to aid in the purpose of relieving "the poor and distressed."''
To determine whether an organization that does not meet the safeharbor guidelines can obtain charitable status, the IRS examines whether
the organization relieves the poor and distressed." In making this
determination, the IRS examines all of the facts and circumstances
surrounding the project.' Factors considered include the percentage of
residents with certain income levels, the affordability of the units, the
level of community-based board membership, the provision of additional
social services, an affiliation with a § 501(c)(3) organization, and the
existence of affordability covenants or restrictions.' 24 Therefore,

115. Rev. Proc. 96-32, 1996-1 C.B. 717. The safe harbor simplified the process of determining
whether housing is a charitable purpose by focusing on relief to the poor and distressed. See id.
116. Id.
117. See id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. In addition to relief of the poor and distressed, housing developers that meet any of the
charitable purposes listed in § 501 (c)(3) may be exempt. Id. The purposes within the Revenue
Procedure include, but are not limited to, (1) "[c]ombating community deterioration," (2)
"[I]essening the burdens of government," (3) "[e]limination of discrimination and prejudice," (4)
"[lI]essening neighborhood tensions," and (5) "[r]elief of the elderly or physically handicapped." Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.

Tax Credit Partnerships
organizations that do not satisfy the safe harbor must demonstrate a
commitment to providing affordable housing to low-income persons.
HousingDevelopers Must Meet Three OverlappingConditions To
Satisfy the Private-BenefitProng

2.

In addition to satisfying the charitable-purpose prong, nonprofit
organizations seeking to maintain their exempt status must satisfy the
second prong: furthering a charitable purpose without conferring a
private benefit. The three factors involved in the private-benefit prong
are the organization's control over partnership activities, risk to the
organization's assets, and private benefit to the for-profit investors. A
chronological analysis of the application of the second prong reveals the
degree to which the factors are intertwined.
a.

EarlyApplications ofthe Private-BenefitProngFocusedon
IncidentalBenefits

During the period after Plumstead,the IRS and Tax Court focused on
whether an organization's activities created an impermissible private
benefit or merely an incidental benefit. In 1985, the IRS issued General
Counsel Memorandum 39,444 in response to a request for a
determination of the exempt status of an organization entering into a
partnership created to purchase and lease an office building."z The
memorandum stated that certain incidental private benefits would not
jeopardize an exempt organization's status if these benefits did not affect
the organization's ability to further its exempt purpose.'26 The IRS
determined that the threshold question is whether the partnership furthers
an exempt purpose. 7 In making this decision, the IRS first evaluated
whether the organization's exempt purpose was furthered by the
partnership's activities." The IRS then analyzed whether the partnership
agreement satisfied the control factor of the private-benefit prong by
requiring the exempt organization to "act exclusively in furtherance of its
exempt goals."' 2 9 In determining this question, the IRS focused on the

125. Gen. Courns. Mer. 39,444 (July 18, 1985).

126. See id
127. See id
128. Id.
129. Id
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private-benefit factor of the prong, requiring that benefits received by
for-profit partners be incidental 13 to the public purposes. 3 '
In particular, Memorandum 39,444 considered the composition of the
partnership's board. The IRS feared that the nonprofit general partner
would be swayed by the limited partners and that the charitable purpose
of the organization would not be protected.3 3 To combat this vulnerability, the IRS recommended establishing an independent committee to
monitor the board. 133 The committee would decrease the control of the
limited partners, who would no longer have a strong presence on the
board. 134 The IRS found that minimizing the control of the limited
partners would eliminate the potential for the limited partners to create
private benefits. 3 ' If the limited partners are not creating benefits, the
benefits are more likely to be viewed as incidental.
Four years after Memorandum 39,444, the Tax Court, in American
Campaign Academy v. Commissioner,36 provided further guidance in the
application of the private-benefit prong. American Campaign Academy
was organized to train students for positions in political campaigns."'
The IRS discovered that the academy's graduates all obtained positions
with Republican candidates and organizations. 38 Consequently, it
determined that the school benefited the private interest of the
Republican Party. 39 The Tax Court stated that qualifying for exempt
status does not depend solely on an organization's purpose or its original
statement of purpose. " Rather, the IRS "look[s] beyond the four comers
of the organization's charter to discover 'the actual objects motivating
the organization and the subsequent conduct of the organization. ' 4
130. Any private benefit must be both qualitatively and quantitatively "incidental" to the overall
public benefit of the activity if the organization is to remain exempt. See Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862
(Nov. 21, 1991). To be qualitatively incidental, the public benefit must be one that could not be
achieved without benefiting private individuals. Id. To be quantitatively incidental, a benefit must be
insubstantial in relation to the public benefit. Id.
131. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,444 (July 18, 1985).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. 92 T.C. 1053 (1989).
137. Id. at 1053.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1053-54.
140. Id. at 1064.
141. Id. (quoting Taxation With Representation v. United States, 585 F.2d 1219, 1222 (4th Cir.
1978)).
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The court analyzed the private-benefit factor by determining if any of
the net earnings were distributed to the benefit of private shareholders or
individuals. First, the Tax Court held that if more than an insubstantial
part of an organization's activities do not further an exempt purpose, the
organization will fail the operational test under § 501(c)(3)." In
addition, if the organization benefits designated individuals, founders,
shareholders, or family members, the organization does not operate
exclusively for exempt purposes.43 On the other hand, infrequent
economic benefits that are incidental to the organization's charitable
purpose are acceptable private benefits.'" This decision is relevant to
LIHTC partnerships because it provides further evidence of the IRS's
position that incidental benefits arising out of partnerships will not
jeopardize the exempt status of a nonprofit general partner.
b.

Housing Pioneers: The LIHTC Partnershipthat Failedthe PrivateBenefit Prong

1 45
the Ninth Circuit restricted
In Housing Pioneers v. Commissioner,
the ability of organizations to maintain their exempt status while
participating in LIHTC partnerships with for-profit investors. The court
held that Housing Pioneers, a nonprofit organization created to provide
innovative, affordable housing and participating in an LIHTC partnership, did not qualify for exempt status."4 In 1989, it partnered with
several for-profit limited partners to develop housing that could be rented
at reduced rates due to the entity's exempt status.'47 The Tax Court held
that Housing Pioneers did not qualify for exemption because it had a
nature' 14 and because
non-exempt purpose that was "substantial in 149
partnership.
the
private investors benefited from

On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, Housing Pioneers argued that as a
matter of law the LIHTC limits the requirements of § 501(c)(3) because
142. Seeat 1065.
143. Id (noting that when organization's net earnings benefit private shareholder or individual, it
creates non-exempt private purpose).
144. See kl at 1066.
145. 58 F.3d401 (9th Cir. 1995).
146. Id.
147. Id at 402.
148. Id. ("This non-exempt purpose was to provide the benefit of both the California § 214
exemption and the federal § 42 credit to partnerships that were not exclusively charitable").
149. Id.
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it provides tax credits to for-profit companies and automatically creates a
private benefit for investors. 5 The Ninth Circuit did not rule on this
issue.' Instead, the court held that the nonprofit failed to "materially
participate" in the development and operation of the project through
activities that were "regular, continuous, and substantial" and therefore
did not qualify as a qualified nonprofit organization within the LIHTC.' 52
Because Housing Pioneers did not qualify as a nonprofit under the
LIHTC, the court focused solely on Housing Pioneers' qualification for
§ 501(c)(3) status. 53 The court upheld the Tax Court's decision that
disqualified Housing Pioneers as a § 501(c)(3) organization because its
activities included a substantial non-exempt purpose: private investors
realized a benefit from the ability to reduce rents because of the tax
exemption without having to depend on the partnership's assets to cover
expenses. 54 Although the court did not specifically refer to the strictscrutiny test, this holding provides an additional example of the types of
private benefits that jeopardize exempt status.
c.

The IRS Has Found Guarantees To Be Impermissible Under the
Private-BenefitProng

Throughout the 1990s, the IRS examined guarantees by exempt
organizations that placed charitable assets at risk to protect the assets of
investors. The low value of an exempt organization's assets-generally
unimproved land or dilapidated housing--often causes investors to seek
indemnities and guarantees to protect their investment. 5 5 Investors in
housing for low-income persons want sufficient security before
committing capital to the project. 156 They have the money and often
dictate and draft the terms of the partnership.5 7 Frequently, investors
offer their investment on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.5 8 Ultimately,

150. See id. at 403.
151. Id. at 404.
152. Id. at 403-04.
153. Id. at 404.
154. Id. at 402-03.
155. Klein & Rubin, supra note 2, at 92; see also SANDERS, supranote 7, § 12.2(c)(iii), at 421.
156. Lee A. Sheppard, A Bad Mix: Do-Gooders and Tax Shelters, 19 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV.
23,29 (1998).
157. Kawecki & Friedlander, supranote 4, Part II(2)(B).
158. Id.
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agreements that obligate exempt organizations to place charitable assets
at risk are impermissible because they benefit for-profit investors.
The IRS analysis of impermissible guarantees in a Memorandum and
three Private Letter Rulings provide non-binding examples of the IRS's
application of the private-benefit prong to exempt organizations that
partner with for-profit investors. The rulings detail several types of
guarantees and indemnifications and whether they place the exempt
status of organizations at risk."5 9 One of the rulings also articulates a new
standard for the third factor of the private-benefit prong: that partnerships
must not "overly benefit" private, for-profit investors."6
In 1991, the IRS issued a General Counsel Memorandum that
illustrates the Service's disapproval of loss reserves' from a nonprofit's
assets. In responding to an inquiry from an exempt hospital wishing to
form a joint venture, the IRS determined that the venture created a
private benefit that was "too great... to be considered incidental to the
charitable purposes." 62 One reason cited was that the partnership
agreement required the hospital to establish loss reserves financed with
hospital funds." The IRS viewed the loss reserve as a risk to the exempt
hospital's charitable assets that jeopardized its exempt status" under the
second factor of the private-benefit prong.
In 1997, the IRS issued Private Letter Ruling 97-31-038 concerning
the participation of a § 501(c)(3) organization in a partnership to provide
mixed-income housing. 6 The ruling illustrates that when nonprofit
general partners give environmental indemnifications, credit-adjustment
guarantees, or return-of-capital guarantees to for-profit limited partners,
the nonprofit organization jeopardizes its exempt status.
The nonprofit general partner seeking the Private Letter Ruling
provided environmental indemnifications to investors. Under an initial
environmental indemnification, the nonprofit assumed all liability for
159. See Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Nov. 21, 1991); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-36-039 (June 9, 1997);
Priv. Lr. Rul. 97-31-038 (May 7, 1997); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-16-005 (Dec. 19, 1995).
160. Priv. Ltr. Ru!. 97-31-038 (May 7, 1997).
161. A loss reserve is an account providing money to the partnership if it does not have enough
revenue to cover costs. Kawecki & Friedlander, supra note 4, Part II(5)(A). Loss reserves are
established in advance of any losses and can be from partnership assets or the general partner's
assets. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862.
162. Gen. Couns. Meni. 39,862.

163. Id.
164. See I.
165. See Priv. Ltr.Rul. 97-31-038 (May 7, 1997).
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any future environmental costs.' 66 The partnership later amended the
indemnification to limit liability to gross negligence or willful
misconduct by the general partner. 67 Furthermore, environmental
assessments had previously been made on each of the partnership's
indemnification the
projects. 6 The IRS ruled that under the amended
169
organization's exempt status was not at risk.
The nonprofit general partner also included credit-adjustment
guarantees in the partnership agreement. The partnership amended the
provisions so that the exempt organization was not required to cover any
credit reductions. 71 Credit-adjustment guarantees are commonly used to
assure investors that if the project fails to qualify for any or all of the
estimated LIHTC, the projected returns to the investor will still be
realized. 7 ' The amended agreement provided that additional payments
by the exempt organization would be regarded as a capital
contribution. 72 As a result, the IRS found that the organization's exempt
status was not at risk because the increased capital contribution would be
used to carry out the charitable purpose and would be returned to the
organization upon dissolution."
Finally, the exempt general partner provided a guarantee to return the
investors' capital if the project was not completed on time. 74 The IRS
focused on the fact that three of the projects were already in operation
and remaining completion dates were within the organization's control
because it served as the developer of the project. 75 Consequently, the
IRS determined that the guarantee did not "overly benefit" investors and
76
did not place the exempt status of the general partner at risk.
Of primary importance was the IRS's use of "overly benefit" as a
standard for prohibited private benefits. 7 7 Prior to this ruling, the IRS
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. See id.
170. See id. Tax credits are allocated based on estimated expenses that may change as the project
proceeds. See SANDERS, supra note 7, § 12.2(h), at 433.
171. See SANDERS, supra note 7, § 17.6(b)(ii), at 565; Michael Sanders, Hot Issues Affecting
Partnershipsand Joint Ventures Involving Nonprofits, 20 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 93, 100 (1998).
172. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-31-038 (May 7, 1997).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. See id.
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had used a standard of whether the private benefit to limited partners was
quantitatively and qualitatively incidental to public benefits from the
partnership.' 8 The "overly benefit" standard signified a relaxation of the
incidental benefit standard.
In another non-binding ruling, Private Letter Ruling 97-36-039, the
IRS specifically addressed the participation of an exempt organization
acting as general partner in a limited partnership using the LIHTC. The
exempt organization had a 0.15% general-partner interest and a for-profit
corporation held a 0.85% general-partner interest.'79 Another for-profit
investor owned the remaining ninety-nine percent interest. 8 0
The original partnership agreement was problematic because it
obligated the general partners to return capital to the for-profit investors
upon an allocation differential in the projected credits, a credit shortfall,
or a credit recapture.' 8' The partnership also approved a pledge and
security agreement, in which only the nonprofit agreed to pledge its
entire interest upon default.'82 Therefore, the exempt general partner was
obligated to surrender its partnership interest if the two general partners
could not return the capital of the for-profit investors if there was a
reduction in the amount of LIHTC received by the partnership. The
parties eventually terminated the pledge and security agreement, which
benefited the investors and the for-profit general partner, because it
would be exercised if the for-profit general partner did not satisfy its
guarantees to return capital to the investors 8 Consequently the IRS
ruled in favor of maintaining the exempt status of the organization
because the nonprofit did not place its assets at risk and did not cause an
impermissible private benefit.'84 This decision offers further evidence
that the IRS will deny exempt status to nonprofit general partners who
provide standard guarantees such as loss reserves, environmental
indemnifications, credit-adjustment guarantees, or return-of-capital
guarantees to for-profit limited partners on the basis that the agreements
confer an impermissible private benefit.
178. Sanders & Cobb, supranote 95, at 216. Although no other rulings use this standard, the IRS
referred to the "overly benefit" standard in 1995 continuing professional education materials for

exempt organizations. Kaweeki & Friedlander, supranote 4, Part II(2)(B).
179. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-36-039 (June 9, 1997).
180. Id.
181. Id.

182. Id.
183. l

184. See id
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The Private-BenefitProngIs Met when the Exempt Partner
MaintainsControl over the Joint Venture Such that It Furthersthe
Organization's Exempt Purpose

d.

In 1998, the IRS issued Revenue Ruling 98-15,' which determined
the extent of control by the tax-exempt partner over the partnership's
activities needed to satisfy the control factor of the private-benefit prong.
The ruling focused on whether a nonprofit hospital participating in a
joint venture with a for-profit entity continued to qualify for an
exemption under § 501(c)(3) of the Code. 86 The IRS ruled that an
organization may participate in a partnership without jeopardizing its
exempt status if "participation in the partnership furthers a charitable
purpose, and the partnership arrangement permits the exempt
organization to act exclusively in furtherance of exempt purposes and
only incidentally for the benefit of the for-profit partners."' 87
The ruling detailed two fact patterns. In the first situation, the articles
of organization stated that the governing board would consist of three
members appointed by the exempt organization and two by the for-profit
partners.'88 The document also called for a majority vote (at least three
members) to approve "certain major decisions."' 89 Furthermore, the
governing documents required that the partnership be operated to further
charitable purposes and stipulated that this purpose would override any
duty to operate for financial benefit."9 The second situation differed
because it called for six board members, equally split between the
exempt organization and the for-profit partners.' It also required a
majority vote on major decisions, although the list of decisions was
shorter than in the first situation. 92 Finally, there was no statement of
putting the charitable purpose before the financial interests of the
93
partners. 1
Applying the two-part test, the IRS stated that the control requirement
of the private-benefit prong is met when the exempt partner maintains
185. Rev. Rul. 98-15, 998-12 I.R.B. 6.
186. Id.

187. Id. at 9.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Id. at 6.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 6-7.
Id.
Id. at 7.
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sufficient control over the partnership's activities to demonstrate that the
94 The IRS limited the
partnership furthers exempt purposes.'
determination of satisfying the control factor to whether the organization
maintains voting control. The ruling dictated that a fifty-fifty split in the
board membership agreement would not allow the exempt organization
to make decisions without securing a vote from a member of the forprofit partner.1 95 The IRS determined that the inability to control the
partnership by initiating programs without a vote from the for-profit
member limited the exempt hospital's power to operate "exclusively for
exempt purposes."' 96 Thus, a nonprofit must maintain fifty-one percent
to satisfy the control requirement and retain exempt
voting 19control
7
status.
Nonprofit developers in LIHTC partnerships must satisfy the twoprong strict-scrutiny test to maintain exempt status. The IRS issued a safe
harbor for developers of housing for low-income persons to satisfy the
charitable-purpose prong. The private-benefit prong, on the other hand,
consists of three overlapping factors: the ability to maintain control, the
risk to charitable assets, and the degree of private benefit. These factors
have been the source of numerous General Counsel Memorandums,
Private Letter Rulings, and Revenue Rulings. 9
D.

The CommercialityDoctrineProhibitsExempt Organizationsfrom
Participatingin Activities ConsideredCommercial

Apart from IRS rulings, the courts have developed a separate body of
law, the commerciality doctrine, 199 which has become important in
determining an organization's exempt status. The commerciality doctrine
reflects the belief that it is unfair for exempt organizations to compete
with organizations in the for-profit sector.2 ° Under the doctrine, a tax-

194. Id. at 8.
195. Id. at 9.
196. Id.
at 9.
197. See id.
198. See id; Gen. Cous. Mern. 39,862 (Nov. 21, 1991); Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,444 (July 18,
1985); Gen. Couns. Mern. 39,005 (June 28, 1983); Priv. Ltr. Rut. 97-36-039 (Sept. 5, 1997); Priv.
Ltr. Rul. 97-31-039 (May 7, 1997); Priv. Ltr. RuL. 96-16-005 (Dec. 19, 1995).
199. Better Bus. Bureau of Wash. D.C., Inc. v. United States, 326 U.S. 279 (1945); Living Faith,
Inc. v. Conm'r, 950 F.2d 365 (7th Cir. 1991), affig 60 T.C.M (CCH) 710 (1990).
200. BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 630 (7th ed. 1998).
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exempt organization is engaged in a non-exempt activity when that
activity is undertaken in a commercial manner.'O
The first articulation of the commerciality doctrine came in Better
Business Bureau v. United States.0 2 The U.S. Supreme Court held that
the organization had a "commercial hue" and that its "activities [were]
largely animated by this commercial purpose."2 3 The clearest
explanation of the doctrine is found in Living Faith, Inc. v.
Commissioner.2" The Seventh Circuit identified factors indicative of
commercial activities: (1) selling goods and services to the public, (2)
direct competition with a for-profit, (3) prices common in retail, (4)
advertising, (5) promotional materials, (6) hours of operation similar to
for-profit, (7) salaried employees rather than volunteers, and (8) lack of
charitable contributions.0 5 In both cases the courts affirmed the denial of
exempt status based on the commercial aspects of each organization's
activities.20 6
II. ONLY PIECEMEAL GUIDANCE IS AVAILABLE TO
DEVELOPERS WISHING TO MAINTAIN EXEMPT STATUS
AND PARTICIPATE IN LIHTC PARTNERSHIPS
Although the IRS and federal courts have provided guidance to
various organizations seeking to maintain exempt status, the lack of
comprehensive authority provides only piecemeal guidance for exempt
developers wishing to partner with for-profit investors in LIHTC
partnerships. The clearest requirement is that all exempt organizations
must be organized and operated to further a charitable purpose under
§ 501(c)(3) of the Code.20 7 In addition, the Treasury regulations guide
organizations seeking to obtain or maintain exempt status by providing
both a detailed definition of charitable and tests to satisfy the
organizational and operational requirement.2 8 Beyond these

20 I.
Id. at 629. An act is commercial "if it has a direct counterpart in, or is conducted in the same
manner," as an act of a for-profit organization. Id. at 629-30.

202.
203.
204.
205.

326 U.S. 279 (1945).
Id. at 283-84.
950 F.2d 365 (7th Cir. 1991).
Id. at 372-75; see also HOPKINS, supra note 200, at 640.

206. See Better Business, 326 U.S. at 286; Living Faith, 950 F.2d at 376-77.

207. See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (1994).
208. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.50 1(c)(3) (2000).
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requirements, there is only confusion for the developer hoping to partner
with a for-profit investor.
The inconsistency of the IRS and the courts in the method used to
determine whether an organization's exempt status has been jeopardized
creates a confusing environment for exempt organizations seeking to
protect their status while participating in LIHTC partnerships.
Furthermore, many of the decisions do not focus on the particularities of
the housing industry. Private Letter Ruling 97-31-038 provides the most
complete analysis of the types of guarantees that the IRS will view to be
impermissible private benefits.2 "9 Yet, the ruling is of limited value
because the risk to the general partner's exempt status was minimized
due to the completion of three of the five projects prior to the ruling.2 10
This ruling also introduced the standard of "overly benefit," a more
relaxed standard than the incidental-benefit standard used previously."'
It is unclear which standard currently applies and LIHTC partnerships
have no guidance as to which one to follow. The result of the numerous
tests and various factors relied upon by the IRS and courts in determining
exempt status is a lack of comprehensive authority on protecting exempt
status for nonprofit developers in LIHTC partnerships.
IV. THE IRS SHOULD ISSUE A REVENUE PROCEDURE TO
GUIDE EXEMPT DEVELOPERS APPLYING THE PRIVATEBENEFIT PRONG TO LIHTC PARTNERSHIPS
To protect the exempt status of developers in LIHTC partnerships, the
IRS should issue a Revenue Procedure to provide binding authority for
satisfying the private-benefit prong. Without such guidance, developers
will be at risk of losing their exempt status, and there will be fewer
exempt organizations willing to participate in LIHTC partnerships. First,
the IRS should adopt the position that exempt organizations satisfy the
requirement of furthering the charitable purpose through control of dayto-day management activities. Second, the charitable-assets test, which
prohibits placing charitable assets at risk by providing guarantees to
investors, should allow for an exception for guarantees that are standard
in the development industry. Finally, the IRS should formally adopt the
"overly benefit" rather than the "incidental benefit" measurement to
209. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-31-038 (May 7, 1997).
210. See Id
211. Seeid
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determine impermissible private benefits. Unless the IRS provides more
guidance to protect the exempt status of housing developers, the success
of the LIHTC program will be jeopardized.
The IRS Should Require Exempt OrganizationsTo Maintain
Control of Day-to-DayManagement andNot Majority Voting
Controlon the LIHTC Partnership'sBoard

A.

Exempt organizations should be able to satisfy the control requirement
of the private-benefit prong of the strict-scrutiny tese 2 if they retain
control of the day-to-day management activities of the partnership rather
than establish voting control of the board. The most recent IRS ruling on
the exempt status of an organization in a partnership, Revenue Ruling
98-15, indicates that the IRS will not revoke the exempt status of an
organization that maintains fifty-one percent voting control of the
partnership board and is controlled by a provision in the partnership
agreement obligating the partnership to further charitable purposes." 3 On
the other hand, the IRS finds that an organization without majority voting
control and no statement of charitable purposes has jeopardized its
exempt status." 4 Revenue Ruling 98-15 should not apply to LIHTC
partnerships because it confuses rather than clarifies the issue of control
required by the private-benefit prong of the test.2"' Securing voting
control for certain major decisions, as required by the ruling,2" 6 does not
automatically increase an organization's ability to further the exempt
purpose through the partnership. Rather than applying the ruling to
LIHTC partnerships, the IRS should provide binding authority granting
exempt organizations the greatest opportunity for promoting charitable
purposes without jeopardizing their exempt status.
The first reason the Ruling should not apply to LIHTC partnerships is
that it does not consider the quality of the board membership when
dictating a fifty-one percent control requirement. For example, if a board
member appointed by the investor, but not by the developer, is an expert
in housing for low-income persons and is not motivated by profit, the
lack of voting control by the nonprofit should not be a critical issue. If

212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

See supranote 111 and accompanying text.
See Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-12 I.R.B. 6.
See id.
See supra Part lI.C.2.d.
See Rev. Rul. 98-15.
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the expert is actually voting to promote housing for low-income persons,
the developer's charitable purpose, then the exempt status of the
developer should not be questioned. In General Counsel Memorandum
39,444, the IRS pointed to an independent committee as a favorable
factor for exempt status because it would eliminate the degree of control
of, and the potential for abuse by, the limited partners." 7 Moreover, an
internal IRS manual directs agents to look favorably upon the
appointment of an independent board of directors, especially if the
individuals are involved in low-income housing." 8 Therefore, rather than
focusing on the majority voting control requirement, the IRS should
adopt the position that the appointment of an independent committee
comprised of experts in low-income housing will be a favorable factor in
protecting exempt status.
The second problem with Ruling 98-15 is that it does not specify the
characteristics of major matters subject to the fifty-one percent control
requirement. Although the ruling lists seven topics of major decisions,
the ruling does not specify how to determine whether a decision is major
and subject to the fifty-one percent requirement. 219 A fifty-one percent
control requirement is logical only if it applies either to all decisions or
only to those decisions affecting the charitable purpose of providing
housing to low-income persons. The requirement should not apply to
resolutions, such as changing the name of the partnership, that would not
have any effect on the provision of housing for low-income persons.
The third question arising from the application of Ruling 98-15 to
LIHTC partnerships is whether less than fifty-one percent voting power
would be acceptable to the IRS if the board members are bound by a
statement that charitable purposes take precedent over profit motives."
The fact pattern approved by the IRS contained such a statement and the
scenario rejected by the IRS did not." l However, the inclusion of a
charitable-purpose statement should protect the exempt status of the
developer whether or not it has voting control only if the investors prove
that they are acting in accordance with the statement and that the
partnership is furthering the charitable purpose of the exempt
organization. The Tax Court has stated that it is the conduct of the
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

Gen. Corns. Mem. 39,444 (July 18, 1985).
Kawecki & Friedlander, supra note 4, Part 1(6).
See Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-12 I.R.B. 6.
See kL
Id.; supranotes 190 and 193 and accompanying text.
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organization, not specific statements in the articles, that determine
exempt status.222 IRS officials have also acknowledged that day-to-day
management is more important than anything written in the governing
documents.223 Therefore, although a statement of commitment to
charitable purposes is favorable, a determination of the exempt status of
an organization with less than majority voting control should be based
primarily on whether the partnership is furthering the organization's
charitable purpose.
The final shortcoming of Revenue Ruling 98-15 is that if voting
control is a safe harbor for exempt status, there is no guarantee that
charitable purposes are being furthered. The operational test for
evaluating whether an exempt organization's status is at risk looks
beyond the terms of agreements and examines whether the purpose is
actually being furthered.224 If the fifty-one percent control standard is a
safe harbor, LIHTC partnerships may maintain their exempt status
through securing voting control without "materially participating" in the
daily activities of the partnership as required by Housing Pioneers.2 5
The amount of control that satisfies the requirement of furthering an
exempt purpose should be "material participation" through regular,
continuous, and substantial activities as articulated in Housing
226
Pioneers.
The focus of an IRS determination of an organization's exempt status
should be whether the organization "materially participates" in
partnership activities and, more importantly, whether the partnership is
furthering the charitable purposes of the exempt organization. The IRS
should emphasize the importance of an independent committee and
evidence that an organization's activities are furthering an exempt
purpose. Similarly, the IRS should not base its decision on whether or
not the exempt organization maintains voting control over the decisions
of the Board of Directors of the partnership.

222. See Am. Campaign Acad. v. Comm'r, 92 T.C. 1053, 1064 (1989); see also supra notes 140141 and accompanying text.
223. Barbara Yuill, Tax Policy: Owens to Leave IRSfor Private Sector; Updates Key Tax-Exempt
and Health Care Issues, 209 D.T.R. G-8 (Oct. 29,1999) ("Day-to-day management... is perhaps
the most important factor and possibly even more significant than control of the board or written
agreements between the parties.").
224. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c) (2000); see also supra notes 140-141 and accompanying
text.
225. Hous. Pioneers, Inc. v. Comm'r, 58 F.3d401, 403 (9th Cir. 1995).
226. Id. at 403-04.
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B.

In DeterminingExempt Status, the iRS Should Allow an Exception
to the Charitable-AssetsTestfor StandardGuaranteesby Exempt
Organizationsto Investors

When determining whether the partnership agreement obligates the
nonprofit to place its charitable assets at risk, the IRS should exclude all
guarantees between exempt organizations and for-profit investors that are
standard within the housing industry. This component of the privatebenefit prong has become increasingly important because guarantees and
indemnifications are standard tools in providing security for investors in
partnership agreements0 7 However, the IRS prohibits guarantees that
insulate the limited partner's assets while increasing the risk to the
charitable assets. 8 To allow for more equal footing between for-profit
and exempt organizations competing for the LIHTC, the test should be
amended to allow an exception for standard guarantees such as loss
reserves, environmental indemnifications, credit adjustments, and return
of capital.
1.

Loss Reserves Are a Necessary Component ofLIHTC Partnerships
andShould Not Jeopardizethe Exempt Status ofan Organization

Loss reserves should not affect the exempt status of organizations in
LIHTC partnerships because they are a common method for preparing
for the possibility of lower-than-estimated profits. 9 Loss reserves are
necessary in LIHTC projects due to the collection of lower rents from
low-income persons. In General Counsel Memorandum 39,862, the IRS
found that loss reserves established by the exempt organization place
charitable assets at risk. z0 The IRS should not view such agreements as
placing charitable assets at risk if the exempt organization is entitled to a
priority return of capital upon disposition of the property."' Under such
an agreement, when the partnership sells the property, the assets
contributed by the exempt organization would be returned to the
organization first, then the remaining assets would be divided according
to the partnership interests.
227. See supranotes 155-158 and accompanying text.
228. See Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Nov. 21, 1991); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-36-039 (Sept. 5, 1997);
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-31-038 (May 7, 1997).
229. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
230. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
231. See SANDERS, supra note 7, § 17.6(c), at 567.
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To accomplish the goals of loss reserves without jeopardizing exempt
status, partnership agreements should establish reserves as specific
capital contributions to the partnership rather than commitments to
protect investors' assets.?3 2 If they are classified up-front as capital
contributions to the partnership, the IRS will not view the reserves as setasides from the exempt organization's assets to protect the investor's
assets in the future. Alternatively, the source of the reserves could be the
money earned by the exempt organization from developer's fees rather
than directly from the organization's charitable assets?3 3
Whether the source of the reserve is developer's fees or the exempt
organization's assets, the partnership agreement should provide that the
exempt general partner is entitled to a priority return of capital upon
disposition of the property.3 4 By prioritizing the return of the capital to
the organization, the risk to the charitable assets is minimized. The assets
of the exempt general partner that are placed in the loss reserve will be
returned to the organization before the remaining assets are divided
among the partners. Because the charitable assets are used as a particular
contribution and not as a way to protect the assets of the for-profit
partners, the IRS should allow LIHTC partnerships to establish lossreserves agreements without jeopardizing their exempt status.
2.

EnvironmentalIndemnifications by an Exempt Organizationfor the
Periodof the Property's Use by a PartnershipShould Not
JeopardizeIts Exempt Status

Environmental indemnifications for the period during which the
property is used for low-income housing should not place the exempt
status of an organization at risk because they are common tools in the
development industry.235 The IRS should adopt the view that exempt
developers who obtain environmental assessments to assure that property
is free of contamination and who have control of the project to prevent
future environmental damage will not be placing their assets at risk. The
IRS's disfavor of environmental indemnifications for "all losses
[attributable] to the presence of hazardous materials at any time on or
around the property, whether or not [the presence of the materials was] in
232.
233.
234.
235.

Sanders, supranote 171,
Sanders, supranote 171,
Sanders, supranote 171,
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-31-038

at I01.
at 101; see also SANDERS, supra note 7, § 17.6(c), at 567.
at 10 1; see also SANDERS, supra note 7, § 17.6(c), at 567.
(May 7, 1997).
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[the would-be exempt organization's] control," 6 creates an unfair
competitive advantage in favor of for-profit recipients of the LIHTC who
can freely give environmental indemnifications.
The IRS has determined that environmental indemnifications for the
current condition of property will not jeopardize exempt status, but that
indemnifications for future environmental conditions do place exempt
status at risk. 7 The IRS has found that the warranty of the property by
the exempt organization at the time of partnership formation is
acceptable, especially after a Phase I environmental assessment is
completed. 8 On the other hand, the IRS has found that warranties of
future environmental conditions are impermissible because they protect
the assets of the investors while placing the exempt developer's assets at
risk.- 9 Because exempt organizations control the activities of
partnerships and indemnifications by the general partner are common,
the IRS should not consider environmental indemnifications for the
period of use for low-income housing in determining whether an
organization's assets are at risk.
3.

GuaranteedReturnsDespite CreditAdjustments Should Not Affect
an Organization'sExempt Status Because Such GuaranteesAre
Common in LHTC Partnerships

Minimum investment returns are standard in LIHTC partnerships to
assure investors a reasonable return upon a credit adjustment 4° and
should not jeopardize an organization's exempt status. As the IRS stated
in Private Letter Ruling 97-31-038, minimum investment returns could
lead to an organization failing the private-benefit prong and the loss of
exempt status. 241 Limited minimum investment returns should not
jeopardize the exempt status of an organization because the LIHTC
program, which encourages partnerships between nonprofit organizations
and private investors, does not guarantee the amount of credits that a
project will receive. If the exempt organization is prohibited from
making such an agreement, investors will either turn to for-profit
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

100.

Sanders, supra note 171, at 101 (internal citation omitted).
See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-31-038.
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recipients of the LIHTC who can guarantee a return or only purchase the
credits at a lower price. Both situations will reduce the amount of capital
available to the nonprofit developers.
To be consistent with the LIHTC's preference for exempt
developers, 24 2 the IRS should promote partnerships between exempt and
for-profit partners by allowing such guarantees if capped at the
accumulated developer fees.243 If the guarantee is limited to the
developer fees of the exempt organization, then the organization is only
placing a limited amount of its charitable assets at risk. Furthermore, if
the guarantee is treated as a capital contribution that will be returned to
the charitable investor, the risk to the exempt organization's assets is
minimal.2" Thus, the IRS should not consider standard minimuminvestment-return agreements when evaluating the private-benefit prong.
4.

Return-of-CapitalProvisions Contingenton a Failureof an Exempt
OrganizationTo Satisfy a PartnershipAgreement Should Not
Jeopardizean Organization's Exempt Status

Return-of-capital provisions are a common method of obligating
partners to meet partnership agreements and should not place the exempt
status of an organization in a LIHITC partnership at risk. Examples of
provisions that may result in return of capital are completion
guarantees24 and guarantees of performance goals or activity levels.2"
The IRS's conclusion that these clauses impermissibly place charitable
assets at risk if the provision obligates the developer to return capital out
of its funds places an unfair burden on exempt organizations because forprofit developers are not subject to the same restrictions. 247 Outright
prohibitions on these provisions for exempt organizations would make
partnerships with nonprofit developers less attractive to LIHTC
investors2 48 and reduce the success of the LIITC program. Standard
provisions in partnership agreements such as loss reserves,
environmental indemnifications, minimum investment returns, and

242.
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244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

26 U.S.C. § 42(h)(5)(A) (1994).
See SANDERS, supranote 7, § 17.6, at 565.
See id. at 568.
See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-31-038.
Sanders, supranote 171, at 100.
Sanders, supranote 171, at 100-01.
See Kawecki & Friedlander, supranote 4, Part II(2)(B).
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return-of-capital agreements should not affect the IRS's determination of
exempt status regarding charitable assets being at risk.
C.

The RS Should Commit to the "Overly Benefit" StandardTo
Determine the Existence ofImpermissiblePrivateBenefit in LIHTC
Partnerships

The IRS should formally adopt the "overly benefit" standard for
LIHTC partnerships because it allows exempt developers and for-profit
investors to join in developing much needed affordable housing for lowincome households. In 1982, the Ninth Circuit upheld the Tax Court's
decision to abandon 4 the per se prohibition against private inurement
that prohibited joint ventures between exempt and for-profit investors °
for a new standard of incidental benefits."' Although a 1997 Private
Letter Ruling dealing with an LIIITC partnership introduced the relaxed
standard of "overly benefit,"" 2 it is unclear whether the standard would
apply to all LIHTC partnerships. 3 Despite not using the "overly benefit"
standard in later rulings,' an IRS internal manual refers to this more
relaxed standard.5 5
The IkS should adopt the "overly benefit" standard prior to the end of
the compliance periods of first tax credit properties in 2001.256 At that
time, the partnerships will no longer need to maintain reduced rents, and
the investors may wish to increase rents or sell the project. Although
most LIHTC partnerships include provisions giving the right of first
refusal to the "tax-exempt general partner or other tax-exempt entity,' z 7
the effect of sale proceeds on exempt developers is uncertain. As long as
the exempt developer purchases the property or reinvests the proceeds in
a charitable purpose, the sale will not automatically terminate exempt

249. See Plumstead Theatre, Inc. v. Comm'r, 675 F.2d 244 (9th Cir. 1982), affig 74 T.C. 1324

(1980).
250. See supranotes 88-93 and accompanying text.
251. See supraPart H.C.2.c.
252. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-31-038 (May 7, 1997).
253. In this Private Letter Ruling, the IRS focused on the organization's ability to lessen the
burdens on the government. SANDERS, supra note 7, § 4.2, at 143.
254. See Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-12 I.R.B. 6, 9.

255. See Kaweeki & Friedlander, supranote 4, Part II(2)(B).
256. The LIHTC began in 1986. See SANDERS, supra note 7, § 12.2(a), at 416. The minimum
compliance period is fifteen years. 26 U.S.C. § 42(i)(1) (1994).
257. SANDERS, supra note 7, § 12.2(1), at 438.
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status. 258 However, the proceeds from a sale realized by investors may be

an impermissible private benefit. In order for the exempt organization to
maintain its charitable purpose, the housing must be sold for a minimum
price as detailed in the Code. 259 Generally, the property is also subject to
an additional fifteen-year compliance period that brings down the fair
market value.26 If the fair market value is high enough that the investors
recognize a considerable return, the exempt status of the developer may
be jeopardized. 26 ' The "overly benefit" standard would provide added
security to developers seeking to protect their exempt status at the end of
the compliance period.
This standard should apply to LIHTC partnerships because it will
encourage partnerships between exempt developers and for-profit
investors. The IRS should balance the public benefit from the LIITC
program and the societal benefits associated with an increased supply of
affordable housing for low-income households against the private
benefits of certain market-driven operation benefits.262 The "overly
benefit" standard should be established through a binding Revenue
Procedure to provide clear guidance to nonprofit developers and ensure
that LIHTC partnerships will continue after the first fifteen-year
compliance period.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Low-Income Housing Tax Credit is the primary source of funding
for the development of housing for low-income persons. Despite the
program's role in funding such housing, exempt organizations awarded
credits and entering into LIHTC partnerships do not have clear guidance
for protecting their exempt status. Although the IRS has developed and
applied a two-part test to determine whether an organization qualifies for
exempt status, much of the authority is focused on the more general
§ 501(c)(3) requirements, non-binding, or not specific to housing
organizations. Furthermore, the nature of the LIHTC program and
partnership agreements in the development industry require board voting
provisions and guarantees by the exempt organization that may put a

258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
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nonprofit developer's exempt status at risk. Losing this status would
result in the partnership's loss of the LIHTC and eventually a reduction
in the amount of housing for low-income households.
To maintain the involvement of exempt organizations in LIHTC
projects, the IRS should issue guidance through a Revenue Procedure.
The Revenue Procedure would provide much needed binding authority to
exempt organizations that will enable them to continue to partner with
for-profit investors. The IRS's position would not violate the
commerciality doctrine because nonprofits would not directly compete
with for-profits. In particular, the IRS should specify that exempt
organizations in LIHTC partnerships need only to maintain control of
daily management activities, may provide guarantees that are common
within LIHTC partnerships and the development industry, and may allow
for financial rewards that do not "overly benefit" the for-profit investors.
If the IRS adopts such standards, the risk to the exempt status of
developers in LIHTC partnerships will be minimized and the supply of
housing available to low-income households will continue to increase.

277

278

